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Odds the Brihard goes to grad school and works for a foreign policy think tank? 1 and 3

No need to be dicks, guys. OS does have a lot of insight, I just don't think it's properly applied here.

I do have a lot of friends and relatives that have served in both Iraq and Afghanistan, and it is my old 1SG response in "looking out for the troop" that has me gathering all information possible on the status of the individual soldier in these conflicts.

Yes I am well read on the French expierience in Algeria, as well as in Southeast asia. Colonial wars, are as any action against an "unseen" enemy a balancing act of power vs patience. The British in Palestine also fell vitim to the same issues.

The "Hearts and Minds" approach recalling a term from my era was always a balancing act. But in our case it was GI numba 1, VC numba 10 in the day in the outlaying villes, and then it was VC #1, GI numba 10 after dark as we retreated into our secure areas and the VC did thier thing. What people now fail to realize the Vietnamese people have been fighting "occupiers" for again almost 2000 years and damn near every <40 year old out there in the hinterlands fought against the Japanese or were Viet Mihn who fought against the French. The rural areas was more a warrior culture, the urban areas were westernized to a life of liesure. The joke in the bush was "The good and well motivated soldiers were already VC, the rest were ARVN". We would constantly search villes and every male had a weapon, from Arisakas from the Japanese era, to MAS rifles from the French, to pieces from the 1800's, to AK's. The CIDG was armed with an official mix of the above along with WW2 era American weapons.

The primary problem was the artificial border drawn by the UN in 1954, Ho CHi Mihn came to us first for help unifying VN, we tasgged him "communist" turned him away and he then went to the Russians. Ho Chi Mihn was an American OSS operator during the Japanese occupation.
He was the architech of the unifacation.

Comman to both conflicts though is the battle for logistics, we attampted in VN to cut off the supply chain to the VC/NVA in SVN, just as operations against the Taliban are also geared to a worldwide attack on the Talibans supply chain, as well as incountry interdiction. I do understand that Afghanistan is an assembly of warlords called an individual nation. The British and Russian expierience in Afghanistan should be required reading for our polititians as well as Generals/soldiers there now. Surgically applied force, must attack the head, and the logistics "tail", the "icepick" vs "sledgehammer" approach to have any hope in this. But the application of the "sledgehammer" now and then in an attempt to draw out the main assembly of Taliban fighters must be attempted when intelligence? state there is a chance to draw them out into a "fixed" battle.

Later in my career I spend many a night wandering and staying in some no name ville in El Salvadore or Honduras. Even there the hearts and minds technique was questionable due to thier "official" governemnt appraoch to the "hinterlands". The "Spanish" leadership class, the Metizo (half Spanish/half Indian), and the native peoples themselves meant there were three distinct tiers in thier social structure.

I totally understand the situation in Afghanistan, and the balancing act required, the reason we were so successfull initially was backing the Northern Alliance against the Taliban with our "sledgehammer". Now the Taliban have learned the lesson so well laid out in General Giap's book on the VN War from his side. Giap writes that after Tet, NVN figured all was lost, no way to win. Giap says that he will win on a differant battlefield, that battlefield is the American livingroom, and College campuses. He was well aware of the anti-war movement, and knew we lacked the "will" politically or socially to do what needed to be done to defeat NVN and the VC. The weapons were patience, and the TV in every American livingroom. And his allies were the anti-war movements as well as the American Press.

We agreed to return if NVN violated the "Peace" negotiated in Paris, Giap wrote he knew we would not, built up is forces, and in April of 75 completed the task started in 1951. Even though we signed a promise to SVN to return, we ignored the pleas, and turned our back on them. And Giap predicted this in 1973.

My primary studies at "The Army War College" Senior Non-Commisioned Officers Course was the "Guerilla and Insurgent", understanding the new form of limited war. Yes, I went there in 1987, but the lessons learned on the application of force and total theatre operations are remmembered. And today's generation are utilizing the same lessons taught to us in 1970, 1987, and today. Ans all conflicts are differant, but you can take applications from previous wars and apply them.

And Tolgak/Mbro finding it funny that I may not know what I am talking about on military subjects puts your "political" knowledge into the same light, the differance is that I was a soldier dealing with simular situations, were you ever a politician?

Edited by oldsoldier - 29 October 2009 at 12:53pm

That is what I heard, they will not gather and stand for a fight. And what we called "mousetrap" tactics are the norm. Send a small unit out on a S+D (search and destroy)as we called them, as bait. Once in contact the heavy "trap" would snap, enclosing and killing the force engaging our people. Kinda what the "Teams" are attempting out there isolated, get the local Talibans frustrated with pinpricks where they will commit, and the trap can slap down on them.

On the issue of IED's we had a simular problem with "booby traps". The nasty mantrap kind that were natural and hard to detect till sprung. Crossbows, swingtraps, shapened bamboo flats, the mantra, with the occasional 105/155 artillery shell rigged to blow. The VC were very talented in this.   The locals who wanted nothing to happen that day, would help us by ID'ing any traps in the area. Other days they would let us walk into them. Was always a crapshoot. MyLai was just an example of what happens when troops get continuely "booby trapped" and vent thier frustrations on any locals. Happened more than MyLai only that instance hit the news.

I still have a few friends in Group, I know what I can know on the operational pace of the SF and other units.

My professional opinion is that troops have to get off the FOB's and start operating the way the CAP teams did in VN. Start producing some viable infrastructure to leave behind, employ the locals in producing it, and start giving the locals a reason to assist not only their own security, but to secure us as well. I know that in Kandahar we have our own version of the CAP teams in the CMO, albeit more toothless, but its a start.
We also need to identify those parts of the country that simply do not want us there, and stop helping anyone in that area.
Start focusing on creating more Deh-e-bagh's and the rest will fall into place. Get and keep our soldiers closer to the Afghans and their preoccupations. That’s what a successful counterinsurgency does.

Perhaps Im being silly, but the only way to win in Afganistan, is to win the people. The average Mohammed in the sandbox is either going to support the west or abdullah abdullah in the Taliban, it all comes down to who meets his interests. If the US sends in Marines to eliminate every remotely possible threat, every civilian will turn to the Taliban because GI Joe just killed their son/husband/sister/goat or blew up their house or something. Whereas if the soldier distributes MREs, gives candy to children, then kills a suicide bomber in a crowd of civilians, the soldier is seen as a good person to every citizen of that crowd, hurting the insurgency. After that point, establishing schools/jobs/etc as Bri said, will only help out more.

Originally posted by Rofl_Mao Or we could put a gun to the head of a civilian who might know where the taliban is. Use counter-terror tactics the same way the taliban is using on them? Would they be more afraid of us or them?

Post more. The infusion of unintentional humor into all these political threads is outstanding.

OS speaks the truth here, the last post is entirely accurate. The racial divisions in Afghanistan are a major influence in that countries inability to move into anything resembling a working functioning nation state.. But it can be done, as most of the Uzbeks live in one area, most of the Hazaras live in one area, most of the Tajiks... etc, etc. and it's predominantly Pashtuns that we have to be concerned about.

The only thing worse than having political turmoil behind you and a hostile force to your front, is to have a hostile force all around you, blending in with the population and planting bombs in the roads that you travel down. I'm a Sapper, I don't like bombs that I haven't made myself.

A theory for fighting this war that I've heard discussed around the troop lines and in the back of the LAV is a version of Kit Carsons scouts. During the Indian Wars in the US, the US Army hired Civilian Scouts and they hired and enlisted Indian Scouts. These two groups of Scouts would work directly with the US Army and they would lead them into tribal areas in the west in order to prosecute the war. The Civilian and Indian Scouts, knew the country, knew how to survive and track, and they knew the languages and nuances of the tribes. And they were crucial to the war effort. We should be applying these lessons of warfare in Afghanistan. We have been there for 8 years now, and there are now plenty of ‘Civilian Scouts’ available in that country, that could work along side the ‘Indian Scouts’ or Pashtun Scouts. And of course, both groups would be working for the military, all with the same goal and will. Back them up with reliable airpower in the form of UAV's and give them the ability to draw on a QRF specifically tasked to them and briefed on their tactics. I realize that our SOF guys, and yours, are running all over the hills kicking in skulls wherever they find them, but we should be doing our best to make the rural areas decidedly "non-permissive" for the enemy, and Scouts would be a good way to expand our capability.

But we are just a bunch of non-coms... what do we know?

Originally posted by mbro Odds the Brihard goes to grad school and works for a foreign policy think tank? 1 and 3

Nah... he's just a troop with a brain. We've got lots of those. Unfortunately not enough of them are commissioned.

Any locals running around acting like that are likely to get lit up by a UAV.